By Lain Davis  Off-Guardian

Jul 28, 2025

In Part 1 we looked at the official account of the October 7th Hamas Attack. In Part 2 we examined the official narrative claiming the attack came as a complete surprise to the Israeli authorities who, as a result, were not prepared to defend the people living, working and partying on the Israeli side of the “Iron Wall.”

In Part 1 we remarked on Hamas’ incredible military feat. Hamas—primarily the Hamas’ al-Qassam Brigades and its elite Nukhba Squads, plus a contingent of Islamic Jihad’s al-Quds Brigades—breached the Iron Wall in 29 locations simultaneously. They took out all the automated defences and vital observation and early warning systems, and then proceeded to overrun and hold key military installations. Hamas took the Erez Crossing, the Nahal Oz military base, the Sufa outpost, and the IDF bases close to the Be’eri and Kerem Shalom kibbutzim. The most strategically important base they held was the Re’im military base—home to the primary Israeli defensive force in the region, the IDF Gaza Division.

As we noted in Part 2, even Hamas was supposedly “surprised” by the relative ease with which it took and held these crucial Israeli military positions. There are three stories that have been offered to allegedly account for this.

• Hamas was supposedly able to conduct extensive reconnaissance and thoroughly prepared for their operation without any interference from either Israeli intelligence or the Israeli military.
• Israeli intelligence “failed” so comprehensively—for more than two years—that Israeli officials had no idea what Hamas was planning, were taken by complete surprise and were thus unprepared to defend the southern Gaza border region.
• With the Iron Wall in place, Israeli planners believed Hamas was contained and therefore redeployed the vast bulk of assets defending the southern border region to the West Bank, thereby leaving communities close to Gaza undefended by any significant IDF presence.

A Very Dubious Narrative

We have already discussed why the contention that Israeli intelligence “failed,” to the extent suggested, is preposterous. Indeed, so extensive was the relevant intelligence that the Israeli authorities were known to have had in their possession that the offered official explanation of “failure,” to account for Israeli inaction, is not tenable.

What the evidence shows is not that the intelligence wasn’t gathered or that the alarm was’t raised, but that senior officials ignored it. It is not unreasonable to speculate that this was a deliberate decision. Logically, this can only have been taken at the highest level. Further evidence strengthens that contention.

Read full article here:

https://off-guardian.org/2025/07/28/unacknowledged-false-flags-the-october-7th-hamas-attack-part-3/