From Moon of Alabama blog:
Reflecting upon the events of the past month.
The Ukrainian spiderweb operation in Russia was a shock to both the Russian military establishment and the world at large, and demonstrated one of the new directions in warfare by combining modern drone technology with a network of in-country saboteurs and up-to-date satellite reconnaissance. While partially successful tactically (maybe a dozen strategic bombers damaged or destroyed), I think the main success was the shock value plus the audacity of attacking an aspect of Russia’s nuclear deterrent. Overall likely about a 20% tactical success as the attack failed to damage some targeted bases and the destruction less than optimal where the base security was overcome. Local population managed to spontaneously disable some of the drone trucks. No effect on Russia’s SMO operation in Ukraine, or perhaps a very minimal and temporary one.
Likely modeled on the ideas for the attack that the Israelis were in the process of preparing in Iran, I would guess that it was primarily a Ukrainian operation using their network of agents and resources within Russia, but likely conceived with western collaboration through British, American, and Israeli intelligence services. As for the timing, I tend to doubt that it was coordinated with or known to the Israelis who likely worried that the methods would be observed by the Iranians and possibly disrupt their planned operation.
The Israeli operation was much more complex and sophisticated, and like the pager operation, likely represented years of planning and preparation along with real-time information required to carry out the targeted assassinations, plus the attempt to disrupt communications and defense networks with cyber attacks. This was combined with the geopolitical deception of using the ongoing US-Iranian negotiations as cover and misdirection. I believe the US knew of the Israeli plans and gave a ‘green light’ based on Israeli assurances that US help was not required for success.
As it developed the plan failed to achieve its primary objectives which seemed to anticipate essentially an Iranian surrender within 48 hours, or shortly thereafter. Once the Iranians recovered their AD capability and began to launch successful rocket attacks against Israel the conflict quickly changed character and developed in a way that became very destructive for Israel. This required Israel to plead for the US to provide some kind of an off-ramp that would allow the Israelis to stop the rocket strikes and save face. This DJT provided after a week of collecting military resources to provide at least the appearance of a credible threat to the Iranians.
Now that this ploy has been run twice the world is on notice, and the method cannot be used again against major players – at least without serious modification. Same with the pager attack. Such plans take a long time to prepare and the target must remain quite ignorant of all essential details. Once deployed it is very difficult to repeat.
It is not clear to me that the Israelis can risk attacking Iran any time soon. AD has been degraded and ammo is in short supply, and will remain so for some time in the west. On the other hand the Iranians have access to partners that have abundant AD resources available and could help them reconstitute a credible defense rather quickly. Unknown how much practical assistance they will actually receive. The Iranians have an outstanding order for SU-35 jets from Russia and have been training pilots for several years. Not sure what, if any, arrangements they have with the Chinese. Russia may have some difficulty fulfilling the order given their ongoing SMO operation and the requirements for it.
Posted by: the pessimist | Jun 27 2025 17:17 utc | 20
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